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1. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of the NKA/INF project is to improve the 
functionality and efficiency of accident and emergency planning 
by verifying, demonstrating, and validating the possible 
implementation of advanced information technology. This paper is 
concerned with the role that such an information system should 
take. 
2. PORM8 OF COMPUTERIZED DECISION SUPPORT 
There are many different roles that a computer system for 
emergency management could take. Table 1 provides a list of some 
of the general categories of computer support that could be 
provided. The list is not meant to be exhaustive nor definitive, 
but merely illustrates the range of alternatives that can be 
considered for information support. The categories are ordered 
in increasing order of computational sophistication, or 
alternatively, in decreasing order of degree of user involvement 
in the decision making process. The first category represents 
the case where the computer system serves as a means for 
communicating data between decision makers, fcach user has 
unlimited access to the available data and no processing of the 
data is performed. Thus, the locus of decision making control 
resides entirely with the users, and they must base their 
decisions on the raw data presented to them via the computer 
system. This is the most primitive role that information 
technology could be used for. At the other extreme, category 
six, we have the case where the entire decision making process is 
completely automated. In this case, the locus of control resides 
entirely with the computer; no user involvement is required. 
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The other four categories represent incremental additions to the 
baseline case of category one. For instance, in the second 
category, each user only has access to the information that she 
needs. Thus, the system filters away the raw data that is 
extraneous ta each user. In the third category, the 
representation of information is tailored to the user's 
requirements. Unlike the previous categories which only 
communicate raw data, in this category, the data that each user 
needs are processed by the system to provide higher level 
information about the state of affairs. Thus, the form of the 
information provided by the system is more appropriate for 
decision making purposes. In the fourth category, the 
information system also provides context sensitivity. Thus, the 
system uses its knowledge about the present state of the 
emergency, and adapts its data presentation accordingly. As with 
the other categories, there are many forms that this type of 
support could take. Typical examples are: withholding the 
presentation of information if it can be inferred that it is not 
needed at the present time; bringing the user's attention to a 
certain problem if it is deemed urgent; using knowledge about 
logical constraints within the organization to provide a reduced 
list of action alternatives; providing a different representation 
of the problem according to current system state. In the fifth 
category, computer support is provided in the form of an expert 
system. In this case, the user provides input data into the 
system, and the system provides recommendations for action or 
hypotheses about the state of the emergency by accessing its 
knowledge base of heuristic rules. The final decision concerning 
what action to take resides with the user. In addition, the 
system can also provide some form of explanation facility so that 
the user can know how the system arrived at its conclusion. 
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Table 1. Categories of Computerized Decision Support for 
Emergency Management. 
Category Form of Decision Support Provided 
1 A means for data communication. 
2 A means for filtered data communication. 
3 Tailored representation of each user's 
information needs. 
4 Tailored repre* ntation with context 
sensitivity. 
5 Expert advice with explanation facility. 
6 Fully automated decision system. 
2.1 Selecting an Appropriate Role 
for Computerized Decision Support 
Clearly, the choice of the type of computer support that will be 
provided should be based on many considerations including the 
reliability of the resulting decision, financial resources, 
availability of software and hardware, and above all, the 
characteristics of the problem. We would like to be able to make 
the most of the possibilities that advanced information systems 
have to offer. Taking this view to an extreme, the ideal 
solution would be to automate the entire decision making process. 
Clearly, this is not possible for obvious technical reasons. 
However, even if it were possible, there are those who are 
strongly opposed to any system in which the locus of control 
resides with the computer (Fitter and Sime, 1980). This points 
out the importance of considering, not just how good a solution 
the computer can provide, but also how the role of the computer 
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will affect the human-computer interaction process. Therefore, 
when deciding which category of computer support is best suited 
for emergency management, the most important consideration is the 
interaction between the characteristics of the problem and the 
selected role that the information system will play. This 
interaction will determine the quality of the joint human-
computer system as a whole, and thus will greatly affect the 
efficacy of the system. While conceptual in nature, the role 
that the computer support will take constrains the possible 
implementations that are to be considered, and thus it will have 
an important impact on system design. The issue is fundamental 
yet important. 
1±2 The Role That Has Been Chosen for the NKA/INF Project 
The goal of the NKA/INF project is to develop a set of guidelines 
for directions to take in designing an information system for 
emergency management, and not to actually develop such a system. 
Consequently, an incremental implementation strategy has been 
chosen. Thus, as the prototype system evolves, more advanced 
features will be added on. The approach is described by Berg et 
al. (1987, p. 24): 
"The implementation strategy chosen is thus a multistage 
process. The first stage is to establish a basic 
datastructure to work with and a basic message 
handling/passing system between centres in the emergency 
organisation. The next stage will be to build up databases 
concerning knowledge for each centre and common process 
data. The third step will take care of the intelligence in 
the system. That means to implement the inference/reasoning 
mechanisms the people in the organization use." 
After reviewing the relevance of expert system techniques to 
computerised support systems in emergency management, Berg and 
Yokobayashi (1986, p. 39) concluded that "in order to implement 
this system it seems quite obvious that expert system techniques 
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can be applied." Thus, the decision has been made to adopt 
expert system technology for implementation of the third phase 
described by Berg et al. (1987). 
It is the contention of this paper that, given the 
characteristics of the problem, expert systems may not be the 
most appropriate role for an information system for emergency 
management to take on. In order to avoid any misunderstanding, 
it is important to note two qualifications to this statement. 
First, ve are referring to what the global role of the 
information system should be. This does not rule out the 
possibility of implementing an expert system for a specific 
function within the overall system, e.g., for diagnosis. 
Secondly, when we refer to 'expert system' we are referring to 
the classic expert system approach of which MYCIN is the 
prototype. The definition of what we mean by 'expert system' 
will be defined more clearly below. 
The remainder of the paper will attempt to provide a convincing 
argument to back up this statement. The line of reasoning will 
follow two paths. First, reference will be made to a review 
paper by Bobrow, Mittal, and Stefik (1986) of XEROX PARC who, 
ba^rd on their extensive experience with such systems, outline 
the types of problems that expert systems are useful for, and 
those where expert systems may not be the best alternative. A 
comparison of the limitations of expert systems with the 
characteristics of the emergency management problem will support 
the contention made above. Secondly, a psychological explanation 
of the limitations of tha expert system paradigm for decision 
support developed by Woods, Roth, and Bennett (1987) will be 
described. This account will suggest an alternative role for 
implementing the intelligence in the information system that is 
mora in line with the characteristics of the emergency management 
problem. 
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3. LIMITATIONS OF THE EXPERT SYSTEM APPROACH 
As mentioned above, Bobrow et al. (1986) provide an excellent 
review of both the capabilities and the limitations of state of 
the art expert systems. They begin by stating: "Expert systems 
are no panacea for achieving the impossible or even the very 
difficult....Instead, there are a number of fundamental issues 
and requirements that must be considered" (Bobrow et al.f 1986, 
pp. 881-2). Based on their extensive experience in the area, 
they then go on to provide a set of guidelines for choosing 
appropriate problems and developing successful systems. The 
emphasis is on the fact that the characteristics of the 
application are the prime factor in determining the success of 
the expert system. In this section, we will take up some of 
their guidelines and see how the problem of emergency management 
measures up to the types of problems they consider appropriate 
for expert system use. 
In general terms, expert system technology is best suited for 
tasks that are "fairly routine and mundane, not exotic and rare" 
(Bobrow et al., 1986, p. 886). Compare this with a description 
of the emergency management problem: "The problem domain of 
industrial emergency management has a very unstructured nature. 
The task domain does not exist until an accident has happened" 
(Rasmussen, 1986, p. 39); "The situation may often be rather 
complex and unpredictable" (Rasmussen, 1986, p. 48). While this 
does not preclude the use of expert systems for a specific subset 
of the information system, the mismatch between the capabilities 
of the tool and the characteristics of the problem gives reason 
to seriously reconsider the applicability of the approach. 
• 
Another prerequisite for a successful expert system is the 
availability of a domain expert. "The expert must...understand 
what the problem is and have actually solved it quite often. It 
is not enough to have somebody with a theory about how cases like 
this should be handled or some good ideas about a new way to do 
things" (Bobrow et al., 1986, p. 887). Again, this description 
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does not compare favorably with the characteristics of emergency 
management. It is true that there are a group of people who have 
some general knowledge about how to handle emergencies. But, the 
fact that the existing knowledge is distributed implies that 
there are multiple decision makers. This also presents a problem 
because very little is known about how to create knowledge bases 
that encompass the knowledge of various experts (Bobrow et al., 
1986). 
Also, Bobrow et al. (1986, p. 887) warn that "problems that are 
known to require English-language understanding, complicated 
geometrical or spatial models, complex causal or temporal 
relations, or understanding of human intentions are not good 
candidates for the current state of the art in expert systems." 
We can compare these characteristics to those of the emergency 
management domain, as listed in Berg et al. (1987, p. 11). There 
they describe the problem as being characterized by: uncertain 
data, dynamic situations, many different types of information 
sources, and many organizational units. Clearly, emergency 
management posesses many of the problematic qualities listed by 
Bobrow et al. (1986). In particular, the requirement for 
understanding human intentions is critical, since "the individual 
decision maker will face a larger system including - in addition 
to the physical problem space - the intentional system formed by 
the rest of the task force. In the resulting inter-person 
communication, there will be a need for extensive communication 
of intentions and goals, unless the roles are very well specified 
in advance as it is the case in military organizations" 
(Rasmussen, 1986, p. 48). 
The evidence presented so far gives strong reasons to believe 
that expert systems may not be the most appropriate technology 
for the emergency management problem. It is interesting to note 
that the two other existing applications of information 
technology to this problem domain discussed by Berg and 
Yokobayashi (1986) are not centred around the expert system 
approach. In the approach adopted by Xobayashi et al. (1985), 
the role of computer support is one of information management 
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with access to a common database. An expert system is used, but 
only for plant status and diagnosis. In the approach taken by 
Jaske (1985), decision making is supported by simulation models, 
a geographic database, and map displays. Expert system 
technology is not part of the effort. Is it a coincidence that 
expert systems are not the central focus in either of these 
projects, or is this a reflection of the utility of expert 
systems for emergency management? Given the evidence reviewed so 
far, we tend to opt for the latter view. Interestingly enough, 
after reviewing the state of the art in expert systems, Rasmussen 
(1986, p. 11) reached a similar conclusion: "From this review, 
use of expert systems for support of the decision making process 
on-line seems to be premature. However, AI tools for 
organization of the distributed data base available to emergency 
management may be feasible." This last point suggests that it 
may be possible to design a so-called 'intelligent' decision 
support system without inheriting the problems associated with 
the expert system approach. 
A potential obstacle to adopting an alternative approach to 
computerized information support is that the functional 
requirements of the system may, of necessity, be achievable only 
through expert systems. To examine whether this is the case, the 
functional specifications for the system must be examined. Berg 
et al. (1987) provide a description of both the on-site and the 
off-site system requirements. For the on-site case, 
"The role of the system is to advise, guide and call the 
user's attention to the following subjects: 
- to reshape and present information needed in different 
decision-making situations 
- when requested: to supply advice and guidance in the 
emergency operations, call attention to important tasks 
and dependencies between the organizational units, 
functions and subprocesses involved 
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- to estimate the reliability of measurement data 
- to assist in the preparation of situation assessments and 
prognosis reports" (Berg et al., 1987, p. 9). 
For the off-site case, the system should: 
»- supply each user with only the relevant data 
- inform the centres in the off-site emergency organisation 
of the extent of the accident 
- display activities at other centres 
- have a common database with a record of events, 
counteractions, predictions, etc. 
- keep a record of messages sent and received by the user 
via computer links 
- contain registers of available resources 
- assist each centra in establishing an appropriate 
organization" (Berg et al., 1987, p. 23). 
These specifications result in the information atructura shown in 
Figure 1. If wa compare these functional requirements to the 
different types of information support shown in Table 1, then we 
sea that theaa apecificatione can be accompliahad by support at 
level four. In fact, Figure 1 is very similar to the examples of 
information support that were described for category four. Thus, 
there are no characteristics inherent in the emergency management 
problem that make it imperative that an expert system be used. 
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ACCESS LEVELS 
OFF-SITE EOCs 
ON-SITE EOC 
CONTROL ROOM 
Figure 1. Database hierarchy with a nuaber of access levels. The 
data are processed and stored in a convergent way. Adapted from 
Berg and Yokobayashi (1986). 
4. AW ALTERNATIVE FORM OF DECISION SUPPORT! COGNITIVE INSTRUMENTS 
In the incremental implementation strategy described above for 
the NKA/INF project, the third stage involved implementing 
"intelligence" into the information system. While the use of the 
term intelligence is questionable (see Dreyfus, 1979), the intent 
is to provide powerful computer support for the decision making 
process. In the previous section, we have argued that, due to 
the characteristics of the emergency management problem, expert 
systems are not the most appropriate means for providing this 
type of decision support. However, it was also shown that this 
does not rule out the possibility of implementing other powerful 
AI tools in order to provide the desired system functionality. 
This is an important point, for with the enthusiasm with expert 
systems, it is often overlooked. The choice to adopt AI 
techniques does not necessarily entail the use of expert systems. 
There are many other symbolic processing techniques that can be 
adopted to implement the "intelligence" in the system. In this 
section, we will first describe a psychological explanation of 
the perils of expert systems described in the previous section. 
FT 
INCREASED 
DATA 
PROCESSING 
1 
ENTRY UNPROCESSED DATA 
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Secondly, we describe an alternative means for providing decision 
support via powerful AI techniques. 
1*1 Decision Support Systems as Cognitive Tools 
Woods et al. (1987) apply the metaphor of cognitive tools to 
describe decision support systems (DSS). Given this view, they 
describe two general approaches that can be followed in designing 
a DSS. The first of these attempts to design a cognitive tool as 
a prosthesis, - as a replacement or remedy for a deficiency. The 
second approach consists of designing cognitive tools as 
instruments, - as a means for action in the hands of a competent 
practitioner. Each of these paradigms will be described in turn. 
The discussion that follows borrows heavily from Hoods et al. 
(1987), but the reader is urged to consult the original 
reference. In addition to providing a more detailed description 
of the ideas presented here, it also provides very convincing 
empirical evidence to support the argument of the present paper. 
4JL2 Cognitive Tools as Prostheses 
The primary design goal with the cognitive prosthesis paradigm is 
to apply computer technology to produce a stand-alone machine 
expert that provides the user with a solution to a problem (Woods 
et al., 1987). The majority of existing expert systems fit into 
this form of decision support (see category five in Table 1). 
The interaction process in such systems follows a typical 
pattern. The user is prompted by the computer to enter data that 
is relevant to the problem. Thus, one of the user's 
responsibilities is that of data gatherer. Also, because of the 
computer's inherent limitations as a problem solver, the user 
must view the computer's output as advice rather than as a 
guaranteed solution. Thus, she must decide whether to accept, 
reject, or modify the machine's output. Consequently, the user 
will also act as a solution filterer. Usually, a limited form of 
explanation facility is also available to support this role. 
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Figure 2 shows the resulting role of the human in the prosthesis 
paradigm to computerized decision support. It is obvious that 
the user has a very limited role to play in the system. 
SOLUTION 
FILTER 
1 f 
MACHINE EXPERT 
åi 
HUMAN 
DATA 
GATHERER 
ENVIRONMENT 
Figure 2. The role of the human in the prosthesis paradigm to 
decision support. Adapted from Woods et al. 
(1987). 
Of course, it is possible to provide expert assistance without 
adopting the cognitive prosthesis approach. Indeed, it might be 
argued that the approach advocated in this paper is not that 
different from the approach that has been adopted for the NKA/INF 
project prototype, and that the differences in opinion can be 
attributed to a different definition of what an expert system is. 
Unfortunately, this is not the case. If we compare Figure 2 to 
Figure 3, which shows the control structure that has been 
proposed by Berg et al. (1987) for the information system for 
emergency management, it becomes clear that the approach that has 
been adopted is typical of the cognitive prosthesis approach 
being described above. 
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1 
GET RULE 
I 
GET PROCESS DATA - FETCH FROM DATABASE 
GET INFO FROM USER - WAIT FOR USER INPUT I 
DRAW CONCLUSIONS 
MESSAGE FOR USER - GIVE ADVICE 
I 
DETERMINE NEXT RULE TO SELECT 
Figure 3. Sequence of the inference engine. Adapted from 
Berg et al. (1987). 
4.3 Cognitive Tools as Instruments 
As an alternative to the approach described above. Woods et al. 
(1987) describe the cognitive tools as instruments paradiga to 
computerized decision support. The view of humans as adaptive, 
goal-oriented beings is at the heart of this approach. Thus, 
expertise is viewed as the adaptive ability to utilize tools to 
accomplish a given purpose. The resulting implication for DSS is 
that the user should be allowed to have an active role in the 
problem solving activity. This is in contrast to the passive 
role inherent in the cognitive tool as prosthesis view. Thus, 
the emphasis is on providing the user with powerful tools that 
allow him to attain his goals, rather than recommending a 
solution that is usually appropriate. 
A.A Limitations of Cognitive Prostheses 
A suitable criteria by which to judge the efficacy of a DSS is 
its ability to enhance the range of problems that the user can 
effectively deal with (Woods et al., 1987). To be able to do 
this, the system must be able to deal with the unanticipated 
variability that will always be present in real-world 
applications. This is where the cognitive tools as prostheses 
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paradigm runs into trouble. Because there will always be 
unanticipated situations which the computer cannot cope with, the 
user must take on an active role in order to 'rescue' the 
machine, and thereby ensuring adequate performance. Thus, 
successful system performance depends on the human's ability to 
adaptively apply his domain knowledge in order to deal with 
unforeseen situations. The OSS should be designed in such a way 
as to provide the user with as much help as possible in carrying 
out this essential role. The problem with the prosthesis view is 
that, not only does it not provide support for an active user, 
but it actually makes it more difficult for the user to take on 
such a role! The case study described in Hoods et al. (1987), in 
which a typical expert system was evaluated, shows specific 
instances of the problems associated with the cognitive tools as 
prostheses approach. Users ran into difficulties when: the 
problem was outside the computer's competence; adaptation to 
special conditions were required; and recovery from computer or 
user errors was necessary. The obvious question is: How can we 
design DSS that avoid these problems? 
i_t_5 The Cognitive Instrument Alternative 
The beauty of having a psychological explanation of the problems 
asociated with the cognitive prosthesis approach is that it 
suggests an alternative approach to decision support. The 
alternative is, of course, the cognitive tools as instruments 
paradigm. But what exactly does this mean? How does one go 
about designing cognitive instruments? 
A cognitive instrument is viewed as a provider of the information 
the user needs in order to carry out his problem solving 
activities effectively. This fundamental reorientation in 
perspective (tools vs. prostheses) is an important step towards 
the design of effective 068. Based on a review of the existing 
literature, Woods et al. (1987) suggest some strategies for 
designing 088 as cognitive instruments. For instance, the system 
could process raw data into forms that are more directly 
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applicable to tha questions that tha user must answer during 
decision making (see category three in Table 1). Perhaps the 
most powerful, but as yet unexplored, form of decision support is 
to provide usars with the ability to conceptualize the problem in 
various ways (see category four in Table 1). For instance, the 
computer could enhance the user's ability to: experiment with 
alternative views of the problem apace; predict the effects of 
different decisions before deciding on which one to take; 
understand the implications of a concept or an action by making 
tha abstract properties of tha problem visible; cope with errors 
by providing better feedback. Above all, tha key to deaigning 
DSS aa cognitive instruments is to allow the user to retain the 
capability to use and direct the computer's resources so that 
full advantage ia taken of her domain knowledge and her ability 
to adapt. This is essential if effective decision support is to 
be provided. 
While the metaphor of DSS as cognitive tools leads to some 
important implications, the prosthesis/instrument distinction 
should not be taken too stringently. Obviously, this is a 
aimplification of the problem, but what is important is that it 
does aerve to point out some pitfalls that should be avoided. 
A aora rigoroua account of tha differencea between the prosthesis 
and tha tool paradigms described above, can be deacribed by 
comparing a top-down integrated approach to system design 
(Raamuaaan, 1986) with tha automation of a aingla ayatem function 
via an expert system. The latter ia likely to result in a 
mismatch between the demands of tha task and tha cognitive 
capabilities of tha uaar (i.e., the sane problems identified with 
cognitive proatheaea). in contrast, tha top-down approach aima 
at daaigning a raaourca anvalopa within which tha uaar can act in 
normal, aa wall aa unforeseen aituatione, without violating her 
raaourca limitations (i.e., tha characteristics aasociated with 
cognitive inetruments). within thia approach, it ia irrelevant 
whether tha DSS ia a proetheeis or an instrument. What ia 
important ia that tha allocation of functions between human and 
computer reaulta in an adequate resource/demand match for both 
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computer and human. Nevertheless, this view of the situation 
leads to the same conclusions as those that Woods et al. (1987) 
arrived at with their cognitive tool metaphor. The latter frame-
work was preferred in order to provide a clearer and more 
convincing exposition of the ideas. 
5. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MKX/IKF PROJECT 
The discussion above has shown that the role that the human plays 
in the decision making process has a major impact on the quality 
of the decisions that are made. This empirical fact reinforces 
the importance of the subject of the present paper. The role of 
information technology in emergency management is, without doubt, 
a critical issue. This paper has concentrated on pointing out 
the limitations with the role of computerized support that has 
been selected for the MKA/IMP project (i.e., the expert systems, 
or cognitive tools as prostheses approach). But rather than 
limiting ourselves to a critique, we have suggested an 
alternative solution that is believed to be more in line with the 
characteristics of the emergency management problem - the 
metaphor of decision support as a cognitive instrument. 
It should also be noted that the suggested approach has the 
benefit that it capitalizes on the excellent work that has been 
done on the project to date. Thus, the great effort that has 
gone into specifying the system's functional requirements (Berg 
et al., 1987) and detailing the information needs for the 
preparedness organizations (Holmstrøm, 1987) can still be 
incorporated with the approach being proposed in this paper. In 
addition, the view of decision support as a cognitive instrument 
complements the conceptual description of emergency management as 
a control system provided by Brehmer (1987). Brehmer's work 
provides a fruitful framework for discussing the goals of 
emergency management, and the conditions that will affect the 
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possibilities of achieving these goals, while the cognitive 
instruments metaphor provides recommendations for how the 
implementation of the DSS should be undertaken. Thus, while 
Brehmer is concerned with the problem of how to design a system 
that will cope with the characteristics of the domain 
(functionality), we are concerned with how to design a system 
will cope with the characteristics of the human decision makers 
that will use the system (cognitive coupling). Together, these 
two conceptual frameworks provide a sound basis for the 
development of effective decision support, one that will 
effectively address the problems of the domain in a manner that 
will maximize the performance of the joint human-computer system. 
At the same time, it is also realized that the approach being 
suggested here is somewhat idealistic, given the advanced state 
of the project. It is highly unlikely that the expert system 
approach that has been adopted so far will be abondoned in favor 
of a top-down design following the cognitive instrument paradigm 
(the ideal design solution). However, given that an expert 
system approach will be implemented, there are several things 
that could be done to support the user in dealing with 
unanticipated variability. These are listed below. 
1. If at all possible, base the rules on first principles, 
i.e., support knowledge (Clancey, 1983), rather than 
uncertain inferences (i.e., heuristics). 
2. Explicitly represent the entire inference structure, 
i.e., structural knowledge usually programmed as meta-rules 
(see Clancey, 1983), and make that knowledge available to 
the users so that they are aware of the justifications for 
the lower level rules. 
3. Ensure that the strategic knowledge, i.e., the meta-rules 
that determine which goals to pursue and in what order ( see 
Clancey, 1983), is also explicitly represented and available 
to the user. 
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An in depth discussion of the rationale behind these 
recommendations can be found in Vicente and Rasmussen (1987). 
These measures will allow the operator to recognize the 
situations where the system's heuristics are inappropriate, and 
allow him to cope with the novel events. If the expert system 
approach is to be adopted, it is imperative that these 
recommendations be followed in order to ensure effective system 
performance. At any rate, the pitfalls that may be encountered 
with the expert system approach, as described in this paper, will 
be useful points to check for in the evaluation of the prototype. 
Also, the alternative form of decision support being suggested 
might provide useful input for the final phase of the project in 
which recommendations for future consideration will be made. 
As a final note, it is important not to misinterpret the 
motivation for writing this paper. The purpose was not to 
pointlessly criticize the existing work, but rather to suggest 
that if the expert system approach is retained for the emergency 
management information system, problems are likely to result. In 
developing the argument to back up this claim, it was necessary 
to carefully review the previous work done on the project. This 
process was greatly facilitated by the fact that the project 
participants have provided detailed descriptions of the decisions 
that have been taken, and the rationale behind these decisions. 
In fact, it should be stressed that we were struck by the 
impressive quality of the work that has been done. 
The goal of all involved in this project is to provide a set of 
guidelines that will be instrumental in designing an effective 
and reliable DSS for emergency management. He hope that this 
paper will be viewed as a valid contribution to such an effort, 
rather than as a critique of what has been accomplished until 
now. 
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